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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we view the Internet under a game-theoretic
lens in an effort to explain and overcome the Internet’s
innovation slump. Game Theory is used to model In-
ternet environments as problems of technological com-
petition toward the end of understanding their emergent
phenomena and the evolutionary forces that shape them.
However, our results extend beyond understanding the
Internet architecture toward helping the Internet popula-
tion achieve socially desirable outcomes.
1. INTRODUCTION
Scott Shenker has been quoted to say that “The
Internet is an equilibrium, we just have to identify
the game” [35]. Our contribution in this paper is to
that end. We start with the empirical evidence that
the Internet is in fact an equilibrium, which is no
other than the Internet impasse [3]. ‘Is your system
incrementally deployable?’ has perhaps become the
most frequently asked question in networking for a
good reason: Innovation in the Internet has stag-
nated [34], and many attribute this stagnation to
the lack of incremental deployability of innovative
technologies, a problem that our network architec-
ture exacerbates. This has spurred research efforts
toward devising incrementally deployable systems as
well as architectures enabling favorable to incremen-
tal deployability environments. The overall research
effort is colossal, and perhaps Shenker prompted the
community to identify the Internet’s game for a good
reason, namely, to end the Internet’s bane.
In this paper, we embark on a scientific explo-
ration of network architecture and architectural evo-
lution whose ultimate destination is a radical new
method for the deployment of superior technologies
at the network and transport layers of the Inter-
net. The method is that of insuring deployment
investments, however, to explain why this method
is promising requires a non-trivial mathematical ap-
paratus and significant preparation. Along the way,
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we lay a mathematical foundation for network archi-
tecture by formalizing the process of architectural
evolution at the network and transport layers of the
Internet (the narrow “waist” of the Internet hour-
glass). What do we mean by the terms network ar-
chitecture and architectural evolution though?
1.1 Network architecture
Whenever researchers and practitioners alike talk
about the Internet architecture they refer to a sys-
tem of technologies that have received adoption as
well as their overarching technical principles. We
believe that this technology-centric perspective has
been harmful to the networking community’s effort
to effect innovation. This effort has been focused
on facilitating the implementation of innovation in
software and hardware through designing an Inter-
net around the concept of open interfaces. Although
implementing innovation is clearly an important step
in effecting it, it barely touches upon the thornier
human-centric aspects of this process: The availabil-
ity of superior technologies is not a sufficient condi-
tion for their adoption, far from it.
In this paper, we propose a change in perspective
from the technology-centric view toward a human-
centric one. In the new perspective, the Internet is
understood as a society of agents who choose among
competing technologies and refer to network archi-
tecture as the collective outcome of choices that the
agents in the society make as well as the principles
that govern the society’s decisions. That is not to
say that we should abandon the former perspective,
in fact, they are complementary, and our definition
reflects the judgment call that the human-centric as-
pects of network architecture are poorly understood.
1.2 Architectural evolution
Similarly, there are two conceivable (by us) ways
to define architectural evolution, an endoscopic and
a macroscopic one. In its endoscopic definition, ar-
chitectural evolution is the process by which new
Internet technologies emerge from previous ones. In
its macroscopic definition, it is the process by which
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new technologies are introduced and spread in the
Internet’s ecosystem (that is, how they diffuse). We
believe that the niche of the endoscopic approach is
to understand how technologies are created whereas
the niche of the macroscopic one is to understand
how innovation is effected. In the words of W. Brian
Arthur, “The people who have thought hardest about
the general questions of technology have mostly been
social scientists and philosophers, and understand-
ably they have tended to view technology from the
outside as stand-alone objects. . . . Seeing technol-
ogy this way, from the outside, works well enough if
we want to know how technologies enter the econ-
omy and spread within it” [4].
We believe that the bottleneck in Internet innova-
tion is not a lack of creativity in devising new tech-
nologies but rather a lack of creativity in profitably
deploying them, and, therefore, in this paper, we
take on the macroscopic approach to understand-
ing architectural evolution. To the extent of our
knowledge this is the first attempt to understand
the principles of the diffusion of architectural inno-
vation, although the diffusion of innovation in so-
ciety, in general, has been the subject of extensive
study [39]. Innovating at the core of the Internet
architecture is unique in that the outcome is shaped
by the presence of strong externalities.1
1.3 Game Theory
Viewed as a social system, the Internet is, to a
first approximation, an anarchy, that is, a society
without a publicly enforced government or violently
enforced political authority,2 in the sense that its
agents are free to choose the technologies they em-
ploy. Because of the absence of a central authority,
the social outcome is determined by strategic inter-
action, and, therefore, the approach to studying such
a society is naturally game-theoretic as Game The-
ory’s raison d’eˆtre is to study human behavior in
strategic environments.
Going further, we propose a simple representa-
tion of this social system as a mathematical game
in which the society’s agents correspond to players,
technologies correspond to strategies, and payoffs cap-
ture the incentive structure of the society. The out-
come of such a game (typically a Nash equilibrium)
becomes the social outcome, which, according to our
earlier definition, is the network architecture itself.
In prompting the community to identify the Inter-
1This paper is about innovation whose success depends
on positive externalities. The study of innovation whose
success depends on managing negative externalities is the
subject of an in-preparation paper by the same author.
2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anarchy
net’s game, was Shenker really prompting the com-
munity to identify the Internet’s architecture?
Effecting innovation
The Internet-as-an-equilibrium paradigm not only
extends the theoretical understanding of network ar-
chitecture, but it has the practical benefit of lending
itself to an approach for effecting innovation: To ef-
fect innovation all we need to do is change the Inter-
net’s equilibrium in favor of innovative technologies.
In this way, meeting Shenker’s challenge becomes es-
sential to moving the Internet forward, and, in fact,
we show that insurance works in exactly this way.
1.4 Overview of our results
1.4.1 Scope of this paper
The Internet has enabled significant innovation in
society at large, however, it has resisted repeated
efforts to effect innovation at its core architecture,
namely, the protocols running at the network and
transport layers of the Internet (i.e., layers 3 and 4
in the OSI reference model). This core architecture
has facilitated significant innovation at the link layer
(e.g., the rapid transition to 3G and 4G systems in
wireless and the rapid transition to optical technolo-
gies for fixed access) as well as the application layer
(e.g., Google, Facebook, BitTorrent), however, it is
increasingly being held responsible for stifling the
emergence of radical new applications [34].
In this paper, our goal is twofold, namely, to both
explain why innovation is failing and to propose a
course of action on how innovation can be effected.
Our inquiry on architectural evolution spans both
the network and the transport layers, as to a large
extent they are inseparable pieces of the core archi-
tecture. As part of our inquiry, we expend much
effort on understanding the evolutionary forces that
shape the core architecture. For example, a ques-
tion of great concern is whether players are myopic
in which case incremental deployability would char-
acterize deployable innovation.
1.4.2 Understanding architectural evolution
Our methodology to understanding architectural
evolution consists of devising mathematical models
and using game-theoretic reasoning to explain what
we believe are the most pertinent to architectural in-
novation phenomena, namely, TCP’s dominance at
the transport layer over more aggressive transport
protocols and the failure to effect innovation at the
network and transport layers. That TCP dominates
aggressive transport protocols is hardly an “innova-
tion failure,” however, the explanation sheds impor-
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tant light on the evolutionary forces at work (ruling
out a myopic model of the Internet population) and
facilitates the analysis on why TCP has not yet been
dominated by less aggressive but more efficient vari-
ants (such as TCP Vegas [7]).
Toward the end of understanding why TCP dom-
inates the transport layer, in Section 3, we study
a mathematical abstraction modeling technological
competition at this layer. This abstraction is an im-
portant step toward answering Papadimitriou’s con-
jecture that TCP/IP congestion control is a Nash
equilibrium [36], and it furthers the understanding
of the Internet in two fundamental ways: First, it
demonstrates the actuality of cooperation as an evo-
lutionary force in the Internet. Second, it informs
the networking community’s effort to effect innova-
tion by shedding light on the concept of incremental
deployability: That TCP is an equilibrium implies
that it has been able to outcompete its more ag-
gressive (and, therefore, incrementally deployable)
relatives. This, in turn, implies that incremental
deployability is neither sufficient nor necessary for
a technology to receive deployment (and, therefore,
that it is not panacea in the efforts to effect innova-
tion contrary to folk wisdom).
Thereafter, in Section 4, we study a second (but
related) abstraction whose aim is to capture and ex-
plain a recurring phenomenon in the Internet accord-
ing to which superior over the status quo transport-
layer and network-layer architectures emerge whose
adoption fails. These technologies are notoriously
difficult to deploy incrementally as their success is
contingent on adoption by a significant number of
peers. However, the reasons that such dependency
causes adoption to fail are not well understood. Our
finding is that a plausible explanation for these re-
curring adoption failures is risk aversion, that is, a
propensity in human nature to avoid risky undertak-
ings even if in expectation they are beneficial: Since
success is contingent on significant adoption, unilat-
eral investment in these technologies entails the risk
of being futile (unless other players join forces), and
although adoption is the rational outcome, uncer-
tainty dominates the players’ decisions leading them
to desist from the investment effort.
1.4.3 Engineering architectural evolution
Finally, in Section 5, we take on the problem of
fostering achievement of socially desirable outcomes.
To that end, we propose a method by which a su-
perior technology whose success depends on positive
externalities can overcome a cooperation breakdown.
The idea in this deployment method is to conciliate
aversion against risk by offering the possibility of
insurance, which, as it turns out, in principle, in-
duces adoption without the purchase of insurance by
any potential adopter. The method’s thrust is to
change the incentive structure of the environment:
Purchasing insurance becomes an incrementally de-
ployable strategy against staying with the incum-
bent and adopting the new architecture without pur-
chasing insurance becomes incrementally deployable
against the purchase of insurance, the end outcome
being that the incumbent (and possibly the purchase
of insurance) is leapfrogged by the new architecture.
2. GAME THEORY BACKGROUND
This section reviews standard material in Game
Theory [33, 13, 47].
2.1 Games in strategic form
2.1.1 Players, strategies, and payoffs
We begin with the definition of games in strate-
gic form. To define a game in this form, we need
to specify the set of players, the set of strategies
available to each player, and a utility function for
each player defined over all possible combinations of
strategies that determines a player’s payoffs. For-
mally, a strategic-form game Γ is a triple
Γ = (I, (Si)i∈I , (ui)i∈I),
where I is the set of players, Si is the set of pure
strategies available to player i, and ui : S → R is the
utility function of player i where S = ×iSi is the set
of all strategy profiles (combinations of strategies).
2.1.2 Notational convention
Let N be the number of players. We often wish
to vary the strategy of a single player while holding
other players’ strategies fixed. To that end, we let
s−i ∈ S−i denote a strategy selection for all players
but i, and write (s′i, s−i) for the profile
(s1, . . . , si−1, s′i, si+1, . . . , sN ).
2.1.3 Nash equilibrium
A pure strategy profile σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium if,
for all players i,
ui(σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i) ≥ ui(si, σ∗−i) for all si ∈ Si.
That is, a Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile such
that no player can obtain a larger payoff using a
different strategy while the other players’ strategies
remain the same.
2.2 Supergames
The analysis of strategic-form games depends on
the assumption that players choose their strategies
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simultaneously and that their choices cannot change
post hoc. Repeated games (also called supergames)
allow instead for the possibility of strategy revisions.
We consider supergames that are sequences of iden-
tical stage games, i.e., simultaneous-move games in
strategic form. Let
Γ = (I, (Ai)i∈I , (vi)i∈I)
be the stage game, where Ai is action space of player
i and vi is her stage-game utility function. To define
the supergame, we must specify the players’ set of
strategies and their utility functions.
2.2.1 Strategies
We consider supergames in which players observe
their opponents’ actions at the end of each period,
and condition their choices on their opponents’ his-
tory of play up to the current period. Let at =
(at1, . . . , a
t
N ) be the actions that are played in pe-
riod t, let ht = (a0, a1, . . . , at−1) be the history of
play up to period t, and let Ht be the space of all
period-t histories. A pure strategy si for player i is
a sequence {sti} whose elements sti are maps from
period-t histories ht ∈ Ht to actions ai ∈ Ai.
2.2.2 Utility functions
We make the standard assumption that payoffs are
discounted exponentially and that the discount fac-
tors αi (where 0 < αi < 1) remain constant through
time. Then given a strategy profile
s = ({st1}, . . . , {stN}),
the payoff to player i is
ui(s) =
∞∑
t=0
αtivi(s
t(ht))
where
st = (st1, . . . s
t
N ).
Since 0 < αi < 1 this infinite series converges for
any sequence of payoffs provided these payoffs are
finite.
2.2.3 Nash equilibrium
Finally, the previous definition of the Nash equi-
librium continues to hold in the setting of supergames.
3. WHY IS TCP DOMINANT?
TCP congestion control was designed and deployed
in the Internet in response to a congestion collapse in
1986 [22] and has remained in stable operation since
then. The attempts to effect innovation at the trans-
port layer fall into two classes, those that promote
TCP-friendly technologies (e.g. [7, 49]) and those
that promote radical digressions (e.g., Skype). In
this section, we are concerned with the latter type
of innovation, and, in particular, the effortless strat-
egy of obviating congestion control that, on the sur-
face, appears to be the most profitable one as well.
Understanding why TCP has resisted invasion by
technologies of this sort has been posed by Papadim-
itriou as one of the most significant open problems
in Internet-related algorithmic research: “This inge-
niously simple scheme seems to work, and its users
do not seem eager to abandon it for something more
aggressive, but the origins of this apparent success
and acquiescence are not well understood. One is
justified to wonder: Of which game is TCP/IP con-
gestion control the Nash equilibrium?” [36].
In this section, we attempt to answer this ques-
tion by identifying a game where conditional use of
TCP congestion control by all players is an equilib-
rium. Cooperation is conditional in that players are
eager to obviate congestion control to penalize de-
fectors, which implies that defection does not pay
off in the long run. Since unconditional cooperation
can be exploited by defectors and is, therefore, not
an equilibrium, we may conclude that TCP conges-
tion control’s architectural stability is imputable to
player’s having a theory of mind.
In this section, we draw on Taylor’s analysis of
symmetric prisoner’s dilemma supergames [47]; our
contribution is limited to showing that these games
are an apt model of Internet congestion control and
to interpreting the ensuing implications in the con-
text of Internet architecture.
3.1 TCP Background
To transfer data in the Internet pairs of endhosts
establish transport sessions. Each transport session
has a source, a destination, and a path in the net-
work, which is a sequence of links. Each link has a
capacity, which must be shared among the compet-
ing sessions crossing that link. TCP congestion con-
trol is a distributed algorithm for allocating bitrates
to transport sessions. These rates are a solution to
the rate allocation problem, which is to allocate bi-
trates for all transport sessions that are feasible (in
that the capacity constraints are satisfied) so that
the allocation is both efficient (in that network ca-
pacity is not wasted) and fair (in that sessions are
treated “equally”).
The allocations that have received most attention
in the literature are max-min fair allocations [6] and
proportionally fair ones [24]. In a max-min fair allo-
cation, all sessions are entitled to the same share of
their bottleneck link. However, if a session cannot
use all of its share, perhaps because it has a slower
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rate in another bottleneck, then the excess capacity
is shared fairly among the other sessions.
Proportionally fair allocations approximate max-
min fair ones. In a proportionally fair allocation,
any change in the rates results in the sum of the
proportional changes being negative. Proportional
fairness is better understood as the solution to a
convex optimization problem whose objective func-
tion is aggregate utility (that is, the sum of the util-
ities of transport sessions) subject to capacity con-
straints provided that the utility functions are log-
arithmic. TCP congestion control is a distributed
algorithm that induces a rate allocation, which is
approximately proportionally fair. In this perspec-
tive, TCP is an algorithm for optimizing social wel-
fare in that it solves a global optimization problem
with aggregate utility in the objective function. It
is, therefore, natural to ask: What makes such an
algorithm stable in a game-theoretic sense?
3.2 Rate allocation game
Toward the end of answering the previous ques-
tion, we formulate a game-theoretic version of the
rate allocation problem. Our formulation is intended
to capture a particular scenario of the general rate
allocation problem, namely, one where multiple sim-
ilar transport sessions (similar in that they are trans-
ferring the same or similar content) of unknown du-
ration simultaneously compete for the bandwidth of
a bottleneck link, and our goal is to explain why
these transport sessions would use TCP. Since we
are focusing on a particular scenario, we do not aim
to propose a general theory of TCP’s game-theoretic
stability (which would need to simultaneously ex-
plain more than one such scenarios), but rather to
prove that even in this simple setting, players must
be sophisticated enough to use TCP, which rules out
the possibility of them being myopic.
To define any game, we need to specify the set of
players, their strategies, and the payoffs that combi-
nations of strategies yield.
3.2.1 Players
The vast majority of Internet traffic is content re-
trieval, and the decision on the protocol by which to
retrieve content is made jointly by the content distri-
bution system (e.g., BitTorrent) or content provider
(e.g., Google or various ISP’s) and the enduser. We,
thus, assume that the players in the rate allocation
game are transport sessions since protocol decisions
are made at this level of granularity; for example,
TCP congestion control ensures approximate pro-
portional fairness at the granularity of TCP sessions.
Let N be the number of players, and we use i as the
running index of a player.
3.2.2 Strategies
The rate allocation game is a supergame consist-
ing of an infinite sequence of identical stage games.
At each stage game, we assume that each player has
a binary choice of either using TCP (action C) or a
custom transport protocol that obviates congestion
control (action D). A strategy of player i in this
supergame is a sequence {sti}, where the sti are func-
tions mapping the period-t history of play onto the
action space {C,D} of the stage game. We denote
the strategy of always cooperating by C∞, and the
strategy of always defecting by D∞.
3.2.3 Payoffs
We assume that players compete for the band-
width of a single link; if players are able to sustain
cooperation in this environment, sustaining cooper-
ation in environments where player competition is
less fierce would pose no additional difficulties.
Otherwise the payoff structure is that of a sym-
metric prisoner’s dilemma supergame [47]. The su-
pergame is symmetric in that at each stage game
a player’s payoff depends only on the player’s own
choice, and the number of other players choosing
C. That payoffs are symmetric in the event that
all players cooperate is due to proportional fairness
and the pedantic assumption that, in the absence
of congestion control, each session would send at a
rate higher than one Nth of the link’s capacity. That
payoffs are symmetric among players that have de-
fected is due to all such players using the same trans-
port protocol and there is no reason to believe that
congestion collapse would favor one defecting player
over another.
Let fk be a player’s payoff if the player chooses
C and k others choose C and let gk be the corre-
sponding payoff if the player chooses D and k others
choose C. It is assumed that:
1. ∀k ≥ 0, gk > fk
2. fN−1 > g0
3. ∀k > 0, gk > g0
The first assumption captures that the choice to de-
fect (i.e., to obviate congestion control) dominates
cooperation. Indeed the first player to defect seizes
a disproportionate fraction of the bandwidth, which
he has to share with other defecting players at a
much lower efficiency level than if everyone cooper-
ated; that the efficiency level of a system that obvi-
ates congestion control is lower is attributed to the
ensuing congestion collapse and is captured in the
5
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Figure 1: Two flows crossing a link and one
stage of the corresponding supergame.
second assumption. The third assumption captures
that the payoff of players using the aggressive trans-
port protocol decreases as more players defect.
3.2.4 Numerical example
Suppose the link has bandwidth of 100 units and
serves flows a and b (as shown in Fig. 1), which cor-
respond to the players. Either player may choose
to cooperate (C) or defect (D). If both cooperate,
then the bandwidth is split evenly among them, and
each gets a share of 50 units. If either player uses C
and the other uses D, the former receives 90 units
of bandwidth whereas the latter only 10, and if both
use D, because of congestion collapse, each receives
15 units. This interaction can be represented as the
two-person prisoner’s dilemma game (Fig. 1).
Prisoner’s dilemma has the property that its unique
equilibrium is for both players to choose D, that is,
to obviate congestion control, however, this prop-
erty no longer holds in the corresponding supergame,
which has more equilibria.
3.3 TCP as an equilibrium
The empirical outcome of play in the Internet can
be approximated as universal cooperation: all play-
ers cooperate in all stage games. However, it is
easy to show that universal unconditional cooper-
ation corresponding to the strategy profile
(C∞, . . . , C∞)
is not an equilibrium. To explain the empirical out-
come we must, therefore, consider conditionally co-
operative strategies, that is, strategies where cooper-
ation is contingent upon previous outcomes.
The most prominent of these strategies is tit-for-
tat, which was originally proposed in the setting of
two-person prisoner’s dilemma supergames [5]. Tit-
for-tat is to cooperate in the first game and to choose
the opponent’s previous strategy in succeeding games.
The natural generalization of tit-for-tat in correspond-
ing N -person games is to cooperate in the first game,
and then cooperate if and only if at least n play-
ers cooperated in the preceding game [47]; call this
strategy Bn. If every player uses Bn, then the su-
pergame’s outcome is indeed universal cooperation,
however, is (Bn, . . . , Bn) an equilibrium? Taylor [47]
answers this question in the affirmative provided that
n = N − 1 and
αi ≥ gN−1 − fN−1
gN−1 − g0 ,
where αi is the discount factor of player i. That the
discount factor must be large enough implies that
to sustain cooperation it is necessary that players
are not myopic, which corresponds with intuition:
Myopic players focused on short-term payoffs cannot
escape the dilemma of the one-shot game.
We have, therefore, identified a game and an equi-
librium in this game such that if players use the
corresponding equilibrium strategies, the outcome is
consistent with the empirical outcome of transport
sessions using TCP universally. This analysis is the
first attempt to model rate allocation as a problem of
technological competition between TCP and a more
aggressive variant, and, although we have focused on
one particular (but realistic) scenario, we are able
to conclude that a general theory of TCP’s architec-
tural stability cannot but be based on conditionally
cooperative strategies.
What’s more, tit-for-tat is, to the extent of our
knowledge, the simplest of all strategies that can
sustain cooperation as an equilibrium, which implies
that the Occam’s razor singles out this strategy as
the most likely explanation of the behavioral phe-
nomenon we are trying to understand. We, may,
thus, postulate that Internet players, and, in partic-
ular, content providers, do not defect from TCP con-
gestion control thinking that defection will be coun-
teracted with retaliation from other content providers.
Papadimitrou was, therefore, in part, correct in pre-
dicting that “If we see Internet congestion control as
a game, we can be sure that its equilibrium is not
achieved by rational contemplation, but by interac-
tion and adaptation . . . ” as tit-for-tat is indeed an
adaptive strategy, however, we saw that it is ratio-
nal contemplation (and a theory of mind) averting
players from defecting.
Tit-for-tat is not the only equilibrium of the rate
allocation game; for example, unconditional defec-
tion corresponding to the strategy profile
(D∞, . . . , D∞)
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also is. It is then natural to ask why the Internet
population selects the cooperative equilibrium. We
believe that TCP is a focal equilibrium [33, 42], that
is, an equilibrium that is conspicuously distinctive
from other equilibria and, therefore, one that every-
one expects to be the outcome, and, hence fulfill,
and there are many reasons for this: (1) TCP has
been in stable operation for over 25 years, and it is
known to work. (2) TCP is efficient, maximizing ag-
gregate social utility, and equitable in the sense that
it provides a level playing field; content providers
would have abandoned it had it not facilitated fair
competition. (3) The equilibrium of universal defec-
tion leads to congestion collapse, making it conspic-
uously unattractive; the Internet population would
prefer to steer away from such an equilibrium.
3.4 TCP and incremental deployability
3.4.1 Internet players are not myopic
Since the Internet is to a large extent an anarchy,
understanding its evolutionary forces is a necessary
step toward innovation being effected. The previous
analysis furthers this understanding by substantiat-
ing that, in the Internet, players are not myopic and
that instead they have a theory of mind, which is an
ability to think about other players’ intentions: Al-
though each provider has the myopic choice of em-
ploying an aggressive transport protocol to realize
short-term benefits, they apprehend that acting on
that choice would lead the way to all providers los-
ing their business as other providers will follow suit
to avoid conferring an advantage to a competitor. It
is this theory of mind (and not altruism) that gives
rise to cooperation and averts the long run losses
that would otherwise ensue for all players.
3.4.2 Incremental deployability is not panacea
The networking community has been swift in rec-
ognizing the need to understand the Internet’s evo-
lutionary forces, and the push toward incrementally
deployable technologies seems to spring out of this
understanding. Incremental deployability is under-
stood a property a technology may or may not have,
and if it is the former, it implies benefits to the early
adopters of the technology. From this definition it
is not immediately apparent that building incremen-
tally deployable technologies will help innovation ef-
forts as it is not apparent that such technologies will
receive deployment traction. For example, that early
adopters benefit does not necessarily imply that the
early adopters (or anyone else for that matter) won’t
lose as adoption gains ground. Should early adopter
benefits matter more than long run losses? Natu-
rally, they shouldn’t, and, in fact, they don’t: In
TCP, unilateral defection is incrementally deploy-
able against cooperation, however, as discussed ear-
lier, players choose not to defect to avoid the losses
that transpire thereafter. This further implies that
incremental deployability is not panacea in the ef-
forts to effect innovation, and that the community
should think about innovation more broadly.
3.4.3 Incremental deployability’s niche
That is not to say, however, that incremental de-
ployability is not an important concept; if, for ex-
ample, a technology benefits the social good it is all
the better if that technology is incrementally deploy-
able. There are many examples of technologies that
benefit the social good at the network and trans-
port layers of the Internet that have been notoriously
hard to deploy, and we believe that incremental de-
ployability sprang out of folk wisdom to address the
need of deploying these technologies. Since these
technologies are also inherently difficult to deploy
incrementally, at the initial stages of this research
we were tempted to attribute the deployment fail-
ures to the lack of incremental deployability. How-
ever, TCP’s dominance at the transport layer rules
out this possibility: Internet players are not myopic,
and to understand why innovation is failing we need
to look elsewhere. In the rest of this paper, we at-
tempt a first-principles approach to understanding
and overcoming these deployment failures.
4. WHY IS INNOVATION FAILING?
Superior network- and transport-layer technolo-
gies whose success depends on positive externali-
ties are notoriously difficult to deploy. In this sec-
tion, in trying to understand why, we devise a game-
theoretic model known as a stag hunt that captures
the salient characteristics of the deployment failures.
Using game-theoretic reasoning we reach the con-
clusion that the lack of deployment is attributed to
players being risk averse—they are reluctant to in-
vest fearing that other players will not follow suit—
a conclusion that corresponds with simple intuitive
reasoning. This corroborates the claim that the stag
hunt succeeds in capturing the salient characteris-
tics of the phenomenon we’re scrutinizing. Having
reframed the problem in game-theoretic terms opens
new possibilities for attacking it, a subject we take
on in Section 5.
4.1 Case studies
The network layer of the Internet is that part of
the architecture which provides a best-effort end-to-
end packet delivery service out of a collection of
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routers and links. The main protocols operating
at this layer are IP, intradomain routing protocols
such as OSPF and IS-IS, the interdomain routing
protocol, namely, BGP, and (to some extent) DNS.
There have been many attempts to effect innovation
at the network layer the most prominent of which
are the efforts to deploy IPv6, S-BGP, IP multi-
cast, IP QoS, and DNSSEC. Similarly there have
been many attempts to effect adoption of superior to
TCP Reno (the dominant transport-layer algorithm)
transport-layer technologies such as TCP Vegas and
FAST TCP. We claim that it is possible to capture
the salient characteristics of these deployment efforts
(which we individually discuss below) in one sim-
ple mathematical model. However, since DNS and
DNSSEC are mostly application-layer protocols we
defer their discussion in the interest of space.
4.1.1 IPv6
Motivated by the exhaustion of the 32-bit IPv4
addresses, IPv6 [30] provides a 128-bit address space
(and other secondary features). In all detail, IPv6 is
an incremental change to IPv4, however, since IP is
ubiquitous in the Internet, adoption of IPv6 requires
upgrades at hosts and routers.
Rather than upgrading to the new protocol, the
Internet population has manifested strong prefer-
ence for temporary point solutions such as NAT (Net-
work Address Translation) [21] and address trad-
ing [48], whose success does not hinge on univer-
sal adoption, which is, in fact, the only apparent
reason that the Internet population shows a prefer-
ence against IPv6 since NAT is arguably technically
inferior, violates basic architectural principles, and
induces significant complexity. (See [53] for a discus-
sion.) However, the reasons that conditioning suc-
cess on universal adoption is disconcerting enough to
drive the Internet population to technically inferior
choices are narrowly understood.
To the extent of our knowledge, there is no com-
prehensive plan to effect adoption of IPv6, and most
efforts and proposals focus on increasing the benefits
of partial adoption using techniques such as IPv6-
over-IPv4 tunnels [30] and anycast [38]. Although
the ultimate goal of these techniques is clearly to
eliminate deployment barriers (i.e., to convert IPv6
into an incrementally deployable technology), this
goal has remained elusive.
4.1.2 S-BGP
Routing attacks such as prefix hijacking can com-
promise the availability, integrity, and privacy of In-
ternet communication. S-BGP [27] aims to protect
the Internet from routing attacks and to that end
it requires making use of a public key infrastruc-
ture (PKI) as well as changes to the BGP protocol
to cryptographically protect BGP messages. Adop-
tion of S-BGP entails building a PKI and upgrading
BGP-speaking routers in autonomous systems. The
Internet population has been reluctant to adopt S-
BGP, and the US government has considered the
possibility of mandating its deployment.
Gill et al. [16] propose and evaluate a sweeping
plan for the adoption of S-BGP (or soBGP [51]),
which does not succeed, however, in converting S-
BGP to an incrementally deployable protocol: The
success of their scheme depends on exogenous pres-
sure (such as regulation or subsidies) for adoption to
gain initial deployment momentum.
4.1.3 IP Multicast
IP multicast makes group communication (whether
from one source to many destinations or from many
sources to many destinations) efficient and to that
end it requires extensions to intradomain and inter-
domain routing protocols [11, 40]. Intradomain mul-
ticast has received limited adoption by some service
providers, however, despite having been the subject
of extensive research since the early ’90s, interdo-
main multicast has not received any adoption.
4.1.4 IP QoS
QoS provides quantitative performance guaran-
tees for end-to-end traffic and allows users to se-
lect the level of service. The most prominent efforts
to extend IP’s best-effort service model and provide
QoS in IP networks are IntServ and DiffServ, the
former being a fine-grained mechanism operating at
the granularity of flows and the latter being a coarse-
grained mechanism operating at the granularity of
traffic classes. Both IntServ and Diffserv require
from every router to participate in the system.
4.1.5 Transport-layer innovation
Since the ’90s, researchers have been trying to
improve on TCP congestion control’s performance.
Much effort has focused on delay-based congestion
avoidance algorithms. The first algorithm of this
kind was TCP Vegas [7]. TCP Vegas and related
algorithms such as FAST TCP [49] (see [50] for a
survey) are based on a different principle than TCP
Reno: Instead of detecting incipient congestion us-
ing packet losses, they use round-trip-time measure-
ments to that end (hence the name delay-based al-
gorithms). Delay-based algorithms improve network
throughput if universally adopted, however, if delay-
based and loss-based algorithms compete, the latter
capture a disproportionate fraction of the bandwidth
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as they are more aggressive.
4.2 Modeling innovation as a stag hunt
The success of the previous technologies depends
on positive externalities in that benefits increase with
the number of adopters, and none is known to be in-
crementally deployable. In fact, technologies whose
success depends on positive externalities are inher-
ently difficult to deploy incrementally.
To model competition between an incumbent and
a superior emerging technology whose success de-
pends on positive externalities we use the game-
theoretic model of the stag hunt, which Skyrms [44]
lucidly defines as follows: “Let us suppose that the
hunters [in a group] each have just the choice of hunt-
ing hare or hunting deer. The chances of getting a
hare are independent of what others do. There is no
chance of bagging a deer by oneself, but the chances
of a successful deer hunt go up sharply with the num-
ber of hunters. A deer is much more valuable than
a hare. Then we have the kind of interaction that is
now generally known as the stag hunt.”
In our setting, deer corresponds to the emerging
technology, hare corresponds to the incumbent, and
the hunters correspond to the potential adopters.
That the chances of getting a hare are independent
of what others do reflects the often realistic assump-
tion that the incumbent technology neither benefits
nor suffers from adoption of the emerging technol-
ogy. That there is no chance of bagging a deer by
oneself reflects that the emerging technology is not
incrementally deployable, that the chances of a suc-
cessful deer hunt go up sharply with the number of
hunters reflects the existence of positive externali-
ties, and that a deer is much more valuable than a
hare reflects that the emerging technology is superior
to the incumbent. What follows is a more in-depth
discussion of our assumptions and of the stag hunt.
4.2.1 Modeling network-layer innovation
We think of network-layer players as correspond-
ing to the administrative authorities of autonomous
systems, and we use i as the running index of a
player. We assume that each player has a choice
of either adopting the new technology (strategy A)
or defecting, that is, seceding from adoption (strat-
egy D). In contrast to the previous section, viewing
network-layer innovation as a supergame does not
provide further insight into the problem; the empiri-
cal outcome of the game is universal defection, which
can be explained in the one-shot game without re-
sorting to modeling repeated interactions.
We assume that the payoff of a player who adopts
depends on the size and composition of the con-
nected component of adopters in the autonomous
system graph to which the player’s autonomous sys-
tem belongs, and that this payoff goes up sharply
with the size of this connected component. The pay-
off of a player who defects is zero. If the size of an
adopter’s connected component is small enough, the
adopter’s payoff may be negative (meaning that the
investment effort costs more than the benefit).
If we assume that all players must upgrade to the
emerging technology to make it effective, the payoff
function is given by the following simple formula:
ui(si, s−i) =
 βi − γi, if si = A and q(s−i) = 1−γi, if si = A and q(s−i) = 0
0, if si = D.
where βi − γi > 0 is the net benefit of adoption,
γi > 0 is the investment cost, and q(s−i) = 1 if and
only if there is no D in the vector s−i.
In fact, if we were to make this additional sim-
plifying assumption, we would not significantly lose
generality as players need not correspond one-to-one
with the potential adopters. Rather these players
can represent a good enough subset of the potential
adopters such that if the players in the subset adopt,
the emerging technology becomes incrementally de-
ployable. However, this would only be an approxi-
mation of the incentive structure of the game, and
the reader should bear both formulations in mind.
4.2.2 Modeling transport-layer innovation
Competition between delay-based and loss-based
transport-layer algorithms can be captured by the
rate allocation game of Section 3.2 where coopera-
tion corresponds to using a delay-based algorithm
and defection corresponds to using the loss-based
one. The rate allocation game is a supergame, how-
ever, it is possible to simplify matters if we limit
the supergame’s strategies to tit-for-tat and uncon-
ditional defection, in which case, the rate allocation
game becomes a stag hunt (for example, see [47, 44]).
4.2.3 Properties of the stag hunt
The stag hunt has two pure-strategy Nash equi-
libria, namely, universal adoption and universal de-
fection. Since the former yields a positive payoff to
each player whereas the latter a payoff of 0, universal
adoption is a Pareto dominant equilibrium and ra-
tional choice would predict selection of this equilib-
rium. However, to remain consistent with empirical
evidence, we have to accept the Pareto inferior equi-
librium of no adoption as the outcome of the game.
Selection of the Pareto inferior equilibrium is gen-
erally referred to in the literature as a coordination
failure [9], which we seek to explain and overcome.
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4.3 Explaining the coordination failure
Observe that the coordination failure contradicts
rationality in that potential adopters are given the
opportunity to benefit both individually and as a
group, however, they reject it. Observe further that
the Pareto dominant equilibrium is not incremen-
tally deployable, which would explain the deploy-
ment failure granted that players are myopically self-
ish, a hypothesis we are in the position to rule out:
In the rate allocation game of Section 3.2, players
were shown to have a theory of mind and there is no
reason to believe that in the innovation games we
are considering players are devoid of such capability.
To explain the coordination failure we attempt to
dig deeper into the psychology of human behavior.
To that end we look first at experimental evidence.
4.3.1 Experimental evidence
“But there is contemporary experimental evidence
that people will sometimes hunt stag even when it is
a risk to do so. . . . If the group starts in the basin
on attraction of stag hunting, then the group almost
always converges to all stag hunters. If the initial
composition of the group is in the basin of attrac-
tion of hare hunting, hare hunters take over” [44].
Unfortunately, insofar innovation whose success de-
pends on positive externalities is concerned, poten-
tial adopters qualify as hare hunters. To the extent
of our knowledge, the only innovation facing a stag
hunt whose deployment succeeded using the Inter-
net’s evolutionary forces alone was TCP congestion
control.3 (TCP’s success is discussed further at the
end of this section.) Since the remaining failures
contradict rationality, our explanation by necessity
resorts to theories of bounded rationality [15, 52].
4.3.2 Risk aversion
Which equilibrium will be selected depends on
what each player believes others will do. Why would
a player doubt though that others will adopt? If all
players are rational and this is common knowledge,
there is no reason to doubt that others will adopt
as adoption is the Pareto superior outcome. How-
ever, if rationality is not common knowledge in that
some players doubt that other players are rational,
then adoption becomes a risky undertaking vis-a`-
vis defection (as defection guarantees the status-quo
payoff irrespective of the other players’ choices).
Investment decisions at the level of autonomous
systems, for example, in the Internet are made by
self-interested organizations, which are unlikely to
3It is worth noting that the deployment of TCP/IP had
been mandated [1] whereas BGP replaced a significantly
more limited predecessor.
be grossly irrational (to the extent of acting against
their own interests), and this is generally known.
However, the history of repeated failures to effect
innovation reinforces doubt that other organizations
will follow suit in an investment/deployment effort.
Still, the previous arguments do not suffice to ex-
plain the coordination failure as the benefit of adop-
tion may outweigh the risk. However, it has been
shown experimentally that the presence of risk in a
choice may introduce significant bias in human sub-
jects against making that choice, a phenomenon that
we refer to as risk aversion.
Research in the psychology of decision making un-
der risk by Kahneman and Tversky [23] shows that
individuals have a general preference for outcomes
that are obtained with certainty over outcomes that
are merely probable even if in expectation the prob-
able outcomes yield higher benefits. Since players
that are choosing between the incumbent and the
emerging technology are, in fact, choosing between
an outcome that is obtained with certainty and an
outcome that is merely probable, risk aversion biases
players against the Pareto superior outcome.
There has also been an attempt to mathemati-
cally capture how the presence of risk affects de-
cision making in coordination games (of which the
stag hunt is a special case). To that end Harsanyi
and Selten [20] propose the solution concept of risk
dominance: Of all equilibria, the one being selected
is that which has the smallest risk factor (that is,
is less risky), a quantity that depends on the payoff
structure of the game. In the stag hunt, unless the
benefit of adoption is very large, the inferior equilib-
rium risk dominates the superior equilibrium, and
their solution concept predicts selection of the for-
mer in agreement with empirical evidence.
We may conclude that superior technologies whose
success depends on positive externalities are noto-
riously difficult to deploy because it is risky to do
so, and humans have a natural propensity against
choosing risky prospects. Our conclusion points to
risk management as being essential for deployment
success. This conclusion corresponds with intuition:
Incrementally deployable technologies (for example,
NAT) are effective in risk management as their suc-
cess does not entail any (short-term) risk. Moti-
vated by this conclusion, we look into the possibility
of a standard risk management strategy, namely, in-
surance, as a deployment method, however, before
taking on this subject in Section 5, we revisit the
transport-layer game of Section 3.2.
4.4 Discussion
In both the transport- and network-layer games,
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players face a choice between cooperation and de-
fection, the payoff structure is quite similar, and the
players themselves are also quite similar (they rea-
son about other players’ intentions and they are risk
averse). We are, therefore, interested in answering
why there is a discrepancy in outcome in just one
particular game, the one where TCP competes with
transport sessions that obviate congestion control.
We believe there are three reasons for this:
• Players evaluate other players’ willingness to
cooperate in divergent ways because of the his-
tory of play: Although loss-based algorithms
have been in stable operation for over 25 years,
delay-based algorithms and network-layer tech-
nologies have suffered repeated deployment fail-
ures. Therefore, players in the former game
start in the basin of attraction of stag hunting
and stag hunters take over whereas players in
the latter games start in the basin of attraction
of hare hunting and hare hunters take over.
• Contemporary innovation faces higher deploy-
ment barriers because of the size of the Inter-
net: Congestion control was deployed in a much
smaller Internet.
• Lack of cooperation against obviating conges-
tion control leads to congestion collapse: Play-
ers that face a problem of choice between two
prospects, one risky and the other certain, use
both the probability of the risky prospect ma-
terializing and the payoff difference in their de-
cision. In particular, since the lack of coopera-
tion at the transport layer leads to congestion
collapse, the expected payoff of cooperation is
significantly higher than the payoff of defection,
and, therefore, players choose to cooperate de-
spite cooperation being a risky undertaking.
5. ENGINEERING EVOLUTION
We have hitherto tried to understand cooperation
as an evolutionary force in the Internet, and have
found that evolution’s outcome may be undesirable.
In this section, we ask whether we can intervene in
evolution’s course toward the end of effecting desir-
able outcomes.
5.1 Problem formulation
The problem we aim to solve in this section is how
to induce deployment of a superior emerging technol-
ogy whose success depends on positive externalities.
Using our game-theoretic formulation of this prob-
lem, we are equivalently seeking to advance a group
of risk-dominated players playing a stag hunt to the
Pareto dominant equilibrium.
5.2 Using insurance against risk aversion
The idea we explore to conciliate risk aversion is to
offer the possibility of insurance: Players can buy an
insurance policy from an insurance carrier to hedge
against the risk of a futile investment in the emer-
gent technology. There are many conceivable ways
to formulate the insurance policy that should natu-
rally depend on which technology is being promoted
for adoption, however, devising insurance policies for
specific technologies is beyond the scope of this pa-
per. Notwithstanding the differences between tech-
nologies, we have demonstrated significant common-
alities, which we leverage to demonstrate that insur-
ance can be an effective deployment method.
Toward the end of demonstrating the effectiveness
of insurance, we consider a simple insurance policy
that covers the benefit of universal adoption, un-
der the condition that the insured player adopts. In
the following, we prove that such a simple insur-
ance policy is effective in incentivizing the players
to adopt the emerging technology even if universal
adoption is necessary for adopters to reap the bene-
fits of the emerging technology. The insurance policy
further specifies a target date in the future when el-
igible players are compensated unless adoption has
already taken place. This insurance policy changes
the incentive structure of the environment as follows.
5.2.1 Players
The player set is as before—it may correspond to
administrative authorities of autonomous systems or
to transport sessions.
5.2.2 Strategies
Each player has a choice of three strategies (in-
stead of two), which are to adopt (A), to adopt with
insurance (B), and to secede/defect (D).
5.2.3 Payoffs
The payoff function is defined by the following for-
mula where βi is the benefit of the new technology
(to player i), γi is the investment cost, i is the in-
surance premium, and δi is the reimbursement from
the carrier to the player under an adoption failure:
ui(si, s−i) =

βi − γi, if si = A and q(s−i) = 1
−γi, if si = A and q(s−i) = 0
βi − γi − i, if si = B and q(s−i) = 1
δi − γi − i, if si = B and q(s−i) = 0
0, if si = D.
where q(s−i) = 1 if and only if there is no D in the
vector s−i.
In words, a player i that adopts receives the ben-
efit βi of the new technology as long as adoption
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happens and adoption happens as long as none of
the players chooses D. If a player adopts and at
least one other player secedes, then the player that
adopts receives a negative payoff. However, if a
player adopts with insurance, he is guaranteed a pay-
off of δi− γi− i, which should be positive, irrespec-
tive of the choices of the other players. (We assume
here that player i pays i to the insurer, and if adop-
tion happens, the player receives βi by making use
of the new technology, whereas if adoption does not
happen, the player receives δi by the insurer.) Fi-
nally, a player that secedes receives a payoff of 0.
5.3 Efficacy of insurance
5.3.1 Proposition
We claim that the previous game has a unique
pure-strategy equilibrium, namely, the Pareto dom-
inant equilibrium of the corresponding stag hunt.
5.3.2 Proof
First, we show that strategy profiles containing
one or more D’s cannot be equilibria. Indeed, in
any such profile, a player using D benefits by pur-
chasing insurance (their payoff increases from 0 to at
least δi− γi− i). Then, we show that strategy pro-
files containing no D’s and one or more B’s cannot
be equilibria. Indeed, in any such profile, a player
using B benefits by giving up insurance (their payoff
increases by i). Finally, (A, . . . , A) is a Nash equi-
librium as no player benefits by unilaterally deviat-
ing to another strategy, which completes the proof.
5.3.3 Discussion
Note that the status quo outcome (D, . . . ,D) is no
longer an equilibrium, and that each player’s best
response to the status quo is to adopt the emerg-
ing technology with insurance (strategy B). What’s
more, (B, . . . , B) is not an equilibrium either as start-
ing from this outcome each player benefits by adopt-
ing the emerging technology without insurance (strat-
egy A). Together, (A, . . . , A) becomes incrementally
deployable against the status quo (D, . . . ,D) in two
incremental steps. However, since the first of these
steps must happen mentally in the minds of the po-
tential adopters, it would not be surprising if in ex-
perimental settings some players would be unwill-
ing to take this mental step and choose B instead.
Therefore, it would not be surprising for outcomes
where some players choose B and others choose A
to emerge in experimental settings.
Note also that the reimbursement amount δi must
be large enough such that δi−γi−i > 0, and that it
is not necessary to precisely estimate the benefit βi
of the emerging technology. Note, finally, that the
insurer does not lose by offering insurance, and may
also benefit if some players choose B.
6. RELATED WORK
This paper is a game-theoretic approach to under-
standing the Internet architecture and to effecting
architectural innovation in the Internet infrastruc-
ture at the network and transport layers.
6.1 Internet architecture
6.1.1 Understanding protocol design
Internet protocols such as TCP or BGP were de-
signed in an ad hoc manner, and the effort to devise
rigorous models of TCP (e.g., [25, 31, 32, 43]) or
BGP [18] has received prominent attention. How-
ever, these models explain what TCP, for example,
does rather than why TCP Reno is chosen by the In-
ternet population or why TCP Vegas is not adopted.
6.1.2 Theorizing about the Internet architecture
Chiang et al. [8] theorize that network architecture
can be understood as an asynchronous distributed
algorithm solving a global optimization problem with
network utility in the objective function. However,
this theory does not justify why the Internet popu-
lation is eager to follow the algorithmic steps. For
example, despite IPv6’s benefits, the Internet popu-
lation has been reluctant to adopt it.
6.1.3 Explaining emergent phenomena
Willinger and Doyle [53] argue that the evolution
of the Internet follows a spiral of increasing complex-
ity to achieve robustness to sensitivities. We believe
that much of this complexity is imputable to a lack of
understanding of the Internet’s evolutionary forces:
Understanding these forces better will enable us to
transition to principled, easier to understand archi-
tectures removing unnecessarily complex designs ne-
cessitated by point solutions.
Akshabi and Dovrolis [2] propose a rigorous model
of protocol competition in a layered architecture,
which they use to explain the Internet hourglass us-
ing simulation. The basis of their model, dubbed
EvoArch, is a directed acyclic graph where nodes
represent protocols and links represent protocol de-
pendencies. In all detail, EvoArch is a technology-
centric model of evolution where user incentives are
only captured implicitly by the “evolutionary value”
that dependencies confer on protocols. In contrast,
users are principal entities in our model of evolution,
and user incentives are captured in their generality
by player utility functions.
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Diot et al. [12] and Crowcroft et al. [10] provide
explanations as of why service providers forwent de-
ployment of the much anticipated multicast and QoS
architectures respectively. The perspective that we
offer in this paper that service providers are forgo-
ing deployment because of risk is complementary to
those explanations.
6.1.4 Effecting innovation
There are many proposals aiming to confront the
Internet’s technology-centric barriers to innovation
(for example, see [3, 28, 14, 19]). In contrast, this
paper confronts the system’s human-centric barri-
ers. Previous efforts to effect adoption of technolo-
gies whose success depends on positive externalities
(e.g., [38, 16]) facilitate a smoother transition from
the incumbent to the emerging technology, but do
not eliminate deployment barriers.
6.2 Diffusion of innovation
Diffusion models of innovation assume that the
adoption of an innovation by an agent in a social sys-
tem (typically represented by a graph) is contingent
only on adoption by enough agents in this system.
Examples of diffusion models include ones where an
agent adopts if enough neighbors have adopted [26]
or if the agent belongs to a large enough connected
component of adopters [17]. In contrast, we assume
that the adoption of an innovation is contingent on it
being a best response to the choices of other agents.
Therefore, agents in our model optimize whereas in
diffusion models satisfice. Furthermore, our model is
more general in that it allows modeling competition
among an arbitrary number of technologies.
Researchers have used diffusion models to look for
the smallest possible set of agents (seedset) such that
if exogenous pressure causes them to adopt, the en-
tire social system adopts (e.g., [26, 17]). The advan-
tage of this method is that it concentrates exogenous
pressure, however, there is no guarantee it will find a
small enough seedset. In contrast, insurance makes
adoption individually beneficial for each agent.
6.3 Game Theory
6.3.1 Algorithmic Game Theory
The effort to understand the Internet from the
perspective of Algorithmic Game Theory has focused
on efficiency questions such as ‘What is the price of
anarchy?’ (For example, see [29, 41, 37].) That the
Internet is an anarchy raises, however, equally im-
portant, if not more, questions such as ‘What are
the Internet’s evolutionary forces?’ and ‘How can
we effect innovation?’ Our effort in this paper has
focused on answering those latter questions.
6.3.2 Evolutionary Game Theory
Our model of architectural evolution is closest to
the Maynard Smith and Price’s game-theoretic model
of biological evolution [46, 45]. Their model is simi-
lar to ours in that society’s agents correspond to or-
ganisms, technologies correspond to behaviors, and
the question is which strategies survive competition.
However, in their model, behaviors are genetically
inherited, which gives rise to the evolutionary sta-
ble strategy as the equilibrium concept. In contrast,
since in our model agents are humans, the relevant
equilibrium concepts can be much more sophisti-
cated (and may even correspond to equilibrium con-
cepts in supergames as in TCP).
6.3.3 Coordination games
The method of using insurance to advance players
from the inferior to the superior equilibrium in a stag
hunt is related to a method by Cooper [9] to the
same effect. In the two-player coordination games
Cooper considers, he allows one player the option
of receiving a sure outcome instead of playing the
coordination game and then reasons that subject to
a technical condition this leads to selection of the
Pareto superior outcome, a conclusion that he also
verifies experimentally. In contrast, we consider N -
player games, insurance is an option available to all
players, and it is not an “outside option;” once a
player purchases insurance he commits to adoption.
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